Review of the Intergovernmental Agreement on Biosecurity

Submission by the Commonwealth Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF) to the 2024 Intergovernmental Agreement on Biosecurity (IGAB) Review (September 2024)

General comments

The department welcomes an opportunity to formally make a submission to the IGAB Review discussion paper to ensure that a revised IGAB is fit-for-purpose and reflects and responds to contemporary and future needs.

Overall, in order to meet future operational challenges, the IGAB needs to be refined to be more adaptive and better cover the biosecurity risk continuum (across preparedness and response).

Australia’s biosecurity system is a multilayered network of people, critical infrastructure and technology, partnerships, processes and regulatory activities. The biosecurity continuum requires this network to function cohesively at our border, overseas and within Australia to minimise adverse impacts of pests and diseases on Australia’s economy, environment and the community. The biosecurity system also plays a critical role in maintaining Australia’s trade and market access and facilitating the movement of people, plants, animals, conveyances and goods.

The Intergovernmental Agreement on Biosecurity (IGAB) is fundamental to the partnership between the Commonwealth and state and territory governments in achieving these goals. It has been an important enabler of more timely, effective and science-based decision-making since commencing in 2012. As an agreement signed by First Ministers, the IGAB is acknowledged as the authoritative basis and framework for governments to ensure a consistent, shared and national approach and collectively realise the associated economic, social and environmental benefits.

Biosecurity risks are increasing and becoming more costly and complex, driven by factors such as climate change, unpredictable and increasing trade and travel and changes in land use. These have created complex issues that are impacting Australia’s biosecurity system and the effectiveness of the IGAB.

In addition, increasingly there are biosecurity risks that require a consistent cross-industry and jurisdiction approach, such as diseases that affect animals, humans and the environment e.g. high pathogenicity avian influenza. These increasingly raise issues relating to: social licence; intellectual property and data sharing/privacy arrangements to support national infrastructure (e.g. information systems); urban biosecurity; maintaining scientific and technical capability; traceability and property identification systems; roles and responsibilities; and more efficient coordination of biosecurity activities.

Implementation and effectiveness of the IGAB

The national framework for Australia’s biosecurity system has evolved and matured significantly since the IGAB commenced in 2012 (and was revised in 2019). In August 2022, the National Biosecurity Strategy (NBS) was agreed by all agriculture ministers and provides a collective vision for Australia’s future biosecurity system. Reflecting the concept of ‘shared responsibility’ as outlined in the IGAB, the NBS and the NBS Implementation Plan 2022-2032 presents a shared vision for the biosecurity system agreed by governments as well as key industry groups and non-government organisations.

A revised IGAB needs to consider the increasing complexity of the system, yet be simple and accessible, sustainable and achievable. This could include providing guidance on what ‘shared responsibility’ means for stakeholders, other than the government signatories, so they know how they may be able to contribute. For example, the role of industry in managing or responding to a biosecurity incursion is currently not in the IGAB. There is also an opportunity to highlight the importance of First Nations people in biosecurity programs, incorporating cultural values, traditional knowledge, and connections to the land. The IGAB needs to ensure that commitments are clear, sustainable, realistic and achievable (factoring in budgetary and resourcing issues). In addition, the way the IGAB is structured should reflect an agreed understanding of the commitments made through the agreement and support their consistent application across jurisdictions, for example on domestic, interstate trade and movement of goods.

It is important to ensure that the IGAB is structured to complement state, territory and Commonwealth legislation, as well as international agreements to which Australia is signatory, such as the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) Agreement to ensure Australia continues to meet its obligations around international agricultural trade.

Governance and the National Biosecurity Committee

In looking forward, the national governance and decision-making bodies that operate under the IGAB should be reviewed to ensure they are effectively structured, resourced and empowered to deliver against signatories’ shared commitments under the IGAB.

This includes the National Biosecurity Committee (NBC) and its subcommittees and working groups which implement the IGAB. The IGAB established the NBC to provide strategic advice to the Agriculture Senior Officials Committee (AGSOC) and Agriculture Ministers Meeting (AMM) on managing risk to, and functioning of, the national biosecurity system. This is an important strategic role and the IGAB should ensure the function, membership and risk appetite of the NBC and its policy/technical sub-committees effectively deliver on the IGAB. The IGAB should require that the NBC structure is fit-for-purpose and reflect contemporary governance and reporting standards and frameworks to ensure robust accountability and transparency.

The NBC’s structure is currently large and complex and draws on a relatively small network of biosecurity policy and technical experts. This impacts the capacity and capability to implement often ambitious work programs. Whilst not a direct matter for the IGAB, in the Commonwealth’s view the NBC sub-committee structure and work programs should be rationalised and better targeted towards agreed priorities to ensure scarce resources and put to their most productive and ambitious use.

Cross-jurisdictional cost sharing and funding arrangements

Commonwealth sustainable biosecurity funding

Through the 2023-24 Budget, the Australian Government fulfilled its commitment to deliver long-term sustainable funding for the Commonwealth biosecurity system. The government provided additional funding of just over $1 billion over four years (2023-24 to 2026-27) and $267 million per year ongoing from 2027-28. Regulatory charges for Commonwealth biosecurity activities were reviewed and increased from 1 July 2023, the first significant review since 2015.

The main outcome of the sustainable biosecurity funding package was to provide funding certainty for the department to undertake Commonwealth biosecurity functions, focussed primarily on preventing pests and diseases entering Australia. This significant uplift in resourcing recognises the Commonwealth’s nation-wide focus, and efforts to manage current and emerging biosecurity risks, including increasing capability and supporting better workforce planning, recruitment and retention of staff.

A key aspect of the sustainable biosecurity funding package was giving effect to shared responsibility for biosecurity, consistent with clause 16 of IGAB, as well as increasing transparency and accountability of Commonwealth biosecurity funding and expenditure via the publication of a new annual report (commencing October 2024).

Sustainable Commonwealth funding is an important outcome in the context of the national biosecurity system as it underpins in large part the Commonwealth’s commitment to the IGAB and ability to meet the bulk of its responsibilities outlined in the agreement. It assists in the Commonwealth resourcing its biosecurity functions consistent with clauses 15 and 33d of the IGAB.

Cost shared emergency biosecurity responses

The current three cost sharing agreements (Emergency Animal Disease Response Agreement (EADRA), Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed (EPPRD), and National Environmental Biosecurity Response Agreement (NEBRA)) have served the national biosecurity system well for managing national emergency responses to incursions of plant and animal pests and diseases and those that impact on the environment/social amenity. However, they struggle to manage more complex biosecurity emergencies that cover more than a single sector, with impacts across the plant, animal and environmental sectors.

The current plant and animal response deeds are over 20 years old, and the environmental deed is over 10 years old. Although still relevant, these deeds should be modernised, including, for example, adopting contemporary emergency management arrangements. In addition, consideration could be given to integrating the One Health approach using pathway risk analyses to capture impacts to not only agriculture but to the environment and social amenity. Arrangements for a national surge capacity and capability to cope with very large and/or multiple emergencies could also be considered.

Commonwealth funding contributions to nationally cost-shared responses are separate to the sustainable biosecurity funding provided in the 2023-24 Budget. These are funded through the Pest and Disease Preparedness and Response Programs Specific Purpose Payment. The large number of emergency responses, particularly in the plant sectors, are placing increasing pressure on government and industry resources, elevating risk in relation to parties’ ability to continue to provide resourcing for responses consistent with clause 33d of the IGAB.

IGAB and cost-sharing

It is noted that cost-sharing arrangements are not explicitly referenced in IGAB, but rather implied through the key principle that biosecurity is a shared responsibility between all system participants. Cost-sharing in certain circumstances is a vehicle by which the principles, goals and objectives of the national biosecurity system, as set out in the IGAB, can be met. The Commonwealth supports the IGAB continuing to support a broad, rather than prescriptive, approach to a national biosecurity system that provides arrangements, structures and frameworks involving governments, industry and community that minimise adverse impacts of pests and diseases on Australia's economy, environment and the community while facilitating trade and the movement of plants, animals, people and products.

The emergency response deeds and cost-sharing arrangements are the most significant approach to cost sharing in the national system. Some other aspects of shared effort within the national system are co-funded through generally ad-hoc arrangements, but there are no arrangements in place for cost-sharing of components of the national biosecurity system, such as preparedness, surveillance and containment, in the same vein as emergency response arrangements.

The Commonwealth is not of the view that the IGAB needs to address this, but rather it could strengthen the emphasis on shared responsibility.

In that light, the Commonwealth recognises there may be opportunities to develop other cost-sharing approaches. Consideration could be given to diseases with significant impacts across sectors, e.g. human health, animal health and trade, and the environmental. These considerations may not form part of the IGAB itself but would be important for all signatories in their ability to meet the intent of the IGAB.

Any consideration of expanding cost sharing arrangements across the biosecurity continuum needs to recognise the inherent tension in realising potential benefits with the competing pressures on financial and resource capacity and capability of governments and industry. Moving forward with such an approach would require an agreed and robust prioritisation framework, based on risk, return on investment, scientific evidence and robust evaluation, to underpin investment decisions across the biosecurity continuum.

In any consideration of potential future cost-sharing approaches, DAFF emphasises the importance of all parties providing adequate resourcing to meet their individual biosecurity responsibilities. Cost-sharing should represent a genuine partnership in areas where responsibility is shared by more than one party or where multiple parties working together can bring about more effective outcomes, with contributions developed on a fair and reasonable basis with consideration of the expected benefit. DAFF is supportive of more clearly articulating the term public good in this context.

DAFF supports the IGAB remaining principle, goal and objective based with regard to cost-sharing. Furthermore, DAFF considers the NBS and the NBS action plan are the appropriate means to move toward exploring and developing other national biosecurity cost-sharing arrangements, where needed. Actions proposed under the NBS action plan, include a stocktake of biosecurity funding to identify funding needs and priorities and inform additional funding resources and mechanisms, and development of new public reporting on national biosecurity system funding and expenditure, provide a sound basis for identifying where cost-sharing approaches to components of the national system may be appropriate. In this regard, the Commonwealth views any changes to the IGAB that strengthen parties’ commitment to the National Biosecurity Strategy and its implementation as beneficial.

COVID-19 and the IGAB

The IGAB worked well during Australia’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic, working in concert with other intergovernmental agreements and protocols that were in play during the pandemic.

One Health

The importance of ‘One Health’, the notion of ‘shared responsibility’ and the biosecurity system were emphasised by the COVID-19 pandemic. National Cabinet also raised the importance of and need for a nationally consistent approach to biosecurity threats and increased the socialisation of biosecurity with governments and the community. In its operational role at the border, DAFF was able to continue to effectively deliver biosecurity services to maintain trade and facilitate the movement of humans and animals across the border.

One Health is “an integrated, unifying approach that aims to sustainably balance and optimize the health of people, animals and ecosystems” (World Health Organisation). Its prominence is also because the pressure on global ecosystems has increased due to human population growth, increased international travel, habitat destruction and the effects of climate change. DAFF’s One Health program aims to support One Health approaches to better prevent, detect and respond to diseases impacting animals, humans and the environment.

Over three quarters of emerging infectious diseases have zoonotic origins. A more explicit focus on emerging infectious diseases in wildlife in the stated goals and objectives could be considered. Reducing the likelihood of future spillover events from wildlife to humans or domestic animals is a key consideration for pandemic prevention. The current threat of high pathogenic avian flu is a reminder of the overlap between animal and human health and the increasing threat of zoonotic diseases.

There is an opportunity for the IGAB to modernise though the integration of a One Health approach, where appropriate. To give effect to this, the IGAB would need to articulate the roles and responsibilities of health, environment and other relevant jurisdictional agencies. The interim Australian Centre for Disease Control (CDC) plays a critical role in strengthening national coordination and preparedness for public health threats, and its integration into the IGAB could foster a more cohesive, proactive approach to managing disease risks across Australia's agricultural and environmental sectors.

Any other matters

Strategic intelligence

To support the biosecurity system to meet future challenges, there is opportunity for the IGAB to nominate biosecurity strategic intelligence as a necessary component of robust biosecurity risk management. Strategic intelligence is future-focussed and considers global or national trends, events and conditions that have the potential to impact biosecurity. The value of strategic intelligence is that it empowers decision makers, through threat assessments, to make defensible and reasonable policy decisions and actions that can be taken to avoid future harm. It does this by increasing certainty about the future for decision makers.

Interstate trade

The IGAB commits parties to manage biosecurity issues with respect to interstate trade (clauses 36-38). This review provides an opportunity to explore options for a more effective, modernised and nationally coordinated approach to interstate quarantine and domestic trade. This would support timely, collective coordination/responsiveness to issues, and would be supported by modern information management and traceability systems. It would minimise domestic trade disruptions across state borders (that can also impact on international trade) and minimise disruptions/impacts for industry.

Traceability

Traceability is a keystone to Australia’s biosecurity, food safety and trade. Traceability is identified within the IGAB as a key component and shared responsibility of the national biosecurity system, as an activity undertaken by all participants (and across broader supply chains) (clause 23(m)). Responsibilities for traceability are outlined in clause 35(f) and operationalises national leadership for strategic issues (referenced in clause 34(b)). The IGAB could be strengthened through the enduring and continued engagement of parties and commitment to actions to support the National Agricultural Traceability Strategy 2023 to 2033. These actions are critical to ensuring our systems are fit for purpose and able to adapt into the future, as consumers and trading partners demand more.

Final comments

The department welcomes the opportunity to contribute views on potential improvements to the IGAB and to ensure the best outcomes for Australia’s national biosecurity system.

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