Review of the Intergovernmental Agreement on Biosecurity

Plant Health Australia―response to the 2024 review of the
IGAB
Is the Intergovernmental Agreement on Biosecurity effective and fit for the future?
Plant Health Australia (PHA) welcomes the opportunity to respond to the 2024 review on the Intergovernmental
Agreement on Biosecurity (IGAB).

In our response, PHA will address the specific survey questions for this 2024 review taking into account the guiding questions provided by the independent reviewer.

1. Implementation and effectiveness of the IGAB agreement
Independent reviewer’s early observations page 9
• The independent reviewer has heard unanimous agreement that the IGAB is valuable and necessary in
setting out the framework that underpins Australia’s biosecurity system.
PHA acknowledges that the IGAB is valuable and necessary in setting out the framework that underpins
Australia’s biosecurity system.
• While the IGAB is not legally binding, the Commonwealth and each state and territory are signatories,
which demonstrates a united approach in managing Australia’s biosecurity system.
Currently this represents a united approach in managing Australia’s biosecurity system. However, PHA has concerns that if a fully sustainable funding model is not developed and implemented that encompasses the
Commonwealth, State and Territories, future funding stresses on the agreement brought about by climate change, increasing trade and people movements may lead to the agreement’s breakdown.
• The key biosecurity principles described in the IGAB are timeless, however some of the mechanisms for
implementation seem outdated.
The IGAB operates within a complex system of government, national strategies, deeds, international obligations, etc. Such obligations may make the implementation of the IGAB complicated.
Mapping out these complexities may assist with recommendations on updating mechanisms for implementation.

• The writing style of the IGAB could be made more contemporary, in plainer English and be less
prescriptive to allow flexibility in delivering on obligations.
PHA supports reviewing the writing style of the IGAB to support plain English text. However, the text of the IGAB is very high level, and PHA has a concern that making the text less prescriptive to allow greater flexibility in delivering on obligations may make it more difficult to access the effectiveness of the IGAB.
PHA recommends that the independent reviewer consider aligning the language used in IGAB to that used in the
National Biosecurity Strategy. For example, the Strategy refers to ‘pests’ only not ‘pests and diseases’. Its definition for a plant pest is ‘Any species, strain or biotype of invertebrate or pathogen injurious to plants, plant products or bees’.
• The IGAB establishes the NBC. This review could be an opportunity to look at the ability of the NBC to
provide strategic oversight of Australia’s biosecurity system, intergovernmental relationships, and the
operation of the IGAB.
As IGAB establishes the NBC, the independent reviewer should review the NBC’s Terms of Reference, membership and whether it is now timely to include additional members and reassess members/observers to ensure implementation of the IGAB.

Guiding question 1. Is the IGAB functioning as intended?
PHA acknowledges IGAB’s role as an important mechanism to enable government to be part of a fully functional and efficient biosecurity system, which is vital for the future profitability, productivity and sustainability of
Australia’s plant production industries and is necessary to preserve the Australian environment and way of life.

PHA sees the IGAB as the mechanism by which State and Territory governments and the Australian Government ensure that they are working in concert to support and implement a national biosecurity system. It is a central pillar of the Australian biosecurity system.

PHA is an observer on the NBC, but as PHA membership includes both government and industry, PHA is concerned that industry has a stronger voice in the functioning of IGAB. The independent reviewer may wish to consider how PHA could further assist NBC as an independent co-ordinator for its member industries’ input to the committee.
• Are there specific clauses that impede or promote the successful operation of the IGAB? If so, which
clauses?
Preliminaries, clause 5. This Agreement describes the national biosecurity system primarily for animal, plant and environmental pests and diseases in aquatic (freshwater, estuarine and marine) and terrestrial environments and ecosystems, including pest animals, weeds, fungi and diseases naturally transmitted by and between vertebrate and invertebrate animals and humans. This Agreement does not apply to major animal-borne diseases of humans such as malaria that are primarily managed by Australian and international health agencies.

As the national coordinator of the government-industry partnership for plant biosecurity in Australia, PHA works to help protect Australia from plant biosecurity risks. PHA supports IGAB by bringing expertise, knowledge and stakeholders together to create solutions to ensure Australia’s plant biosecurity system is future-orientated and solutions-focused.

PHA notes that there is national coordination gap in the on-going management of plant pests that are deemed not eradicable but of national significance. The Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed (EPPRD) does include a
‘transition to management phase’ which does not exceed 12 months unless the National Management Group determines that there are exceptional circumstances. The independent reviewer should consider how effective support for ongoing management can be established and maintained for pests and diseases of national significance and how PHA could assist using its role as a national coordinator.

Clause 7a. Biosecurity management is a complex task and Australia's biosecurity system will need to respond to increasing challenges that are changing its risk profile, including:
a. a changing climate altering the range, habitat and spread of pests and diseases, and increasing
severity and frequency of extreme weather events that assist spread of, and increase the susceptibility of,
plants, animals and humans to pests and diseases

Flora and fauna are generally thought of as the plants and animals of a place. PHA recommends using a term that encompasses all biota such as fungi, bacteria, etc. which are all necessary for ecosystem function. PHA suggests ‘Flora, fauna and other biota’.

Preliminaries, clause 8, page 9. ‘Implementation and ongoing management of this Agreement will occur in conjunction with, and be complementary to, other agreements and arrangements in place to manage biosecurity, which include agreements and arrangements for human biosecurity and national security.’

The Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Plan 2024 does not mention terrorism designed to impact agriculture or the environment. Agricultural and environmental terrorism will have lower capability requirements to implement than another type of terrorist attack and will be designed to have maximum impact.
It could be expected that such an attack would potentially affect a wide area owing to multiple introductions and include multiple jurisdictions. An effective eradication response will be critical.

How does the IGAB fit in with agricultural and environmental terrorism? Does this activity need a specific mention in the IGAB particularly if other forms of funding and governance would come into play in these scenarios?

This issue was raised by the National Farmers’ Federation (NFF) for the previous IGAB review, with the NFF noting that a preparedness plan could help inform stakeholders how to prevent an agroterrorism emergency/how to act when an incursion occurs.

Clause 11d. ‘protection of our unique, diverse and flourishing native flora and fauna’
Flora and fauna are generally thought of as the plants and animals of a place. As previously noted, PHA recommends using a term that encompasses all biota such as fungi, bacteria, etc. which are all necessary for ecosystem function. PHA suggests ‘Flora, fauna and other biota’.

Clause 12. Biosecurity is a shared responsibility between all system participants.

It is PHA’s perception that the message of shared responsibility for biosecurity has largely not reached individuals. The word ‘biosecurity’ means different things to different people, if it is understood at all, and the concept of shared responsibility is too vague to be meaningful, particularly without context. These issues are compromising the ability of stakeholders such as PHA to raise awareness of the need to mitigate biosecurity risks.

In addition, industry bodies are only responsible for reaching producers who are members. This means that other risk creators are not covered. For example, 1) producers who choose not to join a peak body such as the high-risk peri-urban producers, and 2) residents of regional towns who can derail area wide management of endemic pests such as fruit flies. There is considerable risk associated with lack of engagement with the general public, as potential risk creators. Australians will inevitably continue to view biosecurity as just the remit of the
Australian Government at the border, not realising their own potential to introduce new pests or spread existing ones.

The IGAB does not include councils around Australia, and local governments are becoming increasingly important members of the biosecurity continuum, particularly for the on-going management of pests and weeds of national significance. The roles of regional Natural Resource Management organisations and environmental
groups should also be considered. The independent reviewer should consider recommendations associated with cost-sharing these on-going activities which fulfil requirements for national significance.

Smaller plant industry bodies struggle to obtain sufficient funding to carry out the biosecurity roles expected of industry. Industries need resourcing if they are to maintain their coordination roles, to keep abreast of biosecurity issues and to resource risk mitigation activities such as supporting on-farm biosecurity through implementing best management practice systems or educating growers with campaigns or biosecurity field officers. They need to be empowered and funded to spread the on-farm biosecurity message, to make it standard practice for producers.

Clauses 14 and 15.
14. Biosecurity investment prioritises the allocation of resources to the areas of greatest return, in terms of risk mitigation and return on investment.

15. Biosecurity activities are undertaken according to a cost-effective, science-based and risk-managed approach.

The ability to prioritise and undertake activities in a science based and risk managed manner implies that there is significant knowledge of a pest’s behaviour especially in a natural system with a potential high number of unknown hosts. Directed investment in impact assessment and economic impacts (including agriculture and the environment) needs to be considered. For example, the range of impacts of Xylella fastidiosa in agriculture and the Australian environment may be very difficult to estimate. As part of the review of the IGAB’s effectiveness, recommendations should be considered that target the knowledge gaps in relation to ‘science based’ research underpinning biosecurity activities. This will again require sustainable funding into the future.

Clause 21. The goal of the national biosecurity system is to minimise adverse impacts of pests and diseases on
Australia's economy, environment and the community while facilitating trade and the movement of plants, animals, people and products.

Facilitating trade also involves facilitating domestic trade which may involve movement restrictions crucial to our biosecurity system. Interstate quarantine is essential for containing established pests but also for preventing the spread of any exotic pests that enter across international border controls. There continues to be little funding available for raising awareness of interstate and regional zone restrictions or to engage with individuals on risks that their activities may pose.

Clause 23j. The national biosecurity system encompasses the full range of activities undertaken by all participants, of which key components include: … j. a national information and intelligence system.

PHA administers a range of digital systems integral to national plant biosecurity: AUSPestCheck®, the Australian
Plant Pest Database, the Pest and Disease Image Library and the Biosecurity Portal. These systems add value to data by collating information and analysing it to transform it into insight and intelligence that informs decision- making, making these systems vital to Australian biosecurity. They are critical infrastructure to support the national biosecurity system.

PHA notes that Agricultural Ministers in their response to the 2017 review of IGAB ‘Priorities for Australia’s biosecurity system: an independent review of the capacity of the national biosecurity system and its underpinning intergovernmental agreement’ committed to building ‘a secure national platform for sharing biosecurity data between government agencies’.

As part of this commitment to securely share biosecurity data, PHA supports both the development of a High- throughput sequencing (HTS) database to underpin Australia’s plant pest biosecurity system as well as the development of a platform (the proposed Biosecurity Trakka) for the rapid sharing and analysis of this genomic
sequence data. High-throughput sequencing has transformed diagnostic analysis, and our biosecurity system needs to utilise the rapid diagnostics that this technology supports. The administration of the proposed HTS database would be coordinated by PHA to help align with other key national plant biosecurity systems such as the Australian Plant Pest Database1 and AUSPestCheck®. The National Biosecurity Strategy’s priorities include enhancing preparedness and response capability through faster information and data sharing to support our system’s resilience and adaptability. The Biosecurity Trakka will support this by utilising the HTS database for rapid accurate diagnostics to respond quickly to plant pest detections.
• How does the IGAB promote collaboration between Commonwealth and state and territory
governments?
The IGAB links to key strategies (National Biosecurity Strategy, National Plant Biosecurity Strategy) and plans that will support implementation of strategies. These strategies provide a framework to ensure the national plant biosecurity system continues to manage risks to Australia’s plant industries, environment and community while supporting trade and market access. As part of the IGAB review, jurisdictions’ collaboration driving progress against these strategies in relation to plant health should be considered.

PHA notes that a wide range of industry peak bodies are members of the National Biosecurity Strategy
Implementation Committee. Industry peak bodies and other organisations are members of the National
Biosecurity Strategy Implementation Working Group whose role it is to engage with a diverse range of biosecurity stakeholders to progress priorities under the National Biosecurity Strategy. However, PHA recommends that partnership opportunities with industry should be further developed to further assist the delivery of biosecurity information down to the producer level and potentially increase collaboration.

PHA and Animal Health Australia work to help protect Australia from plant or animal biosecurity risks respectively and are the national coordinators of the government-industry partnership for plant or animal biosecurity in Australia. PHA (and therefore the majority of its members) is not represented on either the
National Biosecurity Strategy Implementation Committee or the National Biosecurity Strategy Implementation
Working Group.
• Is the ‘opt-in, opt-out’ nature of the document conducive to a national approach to managing
biosecurity?
While the IGAB framework successfully sets out the roles and responsibilities of governments it is necessary for all agencies to be funded adequately so that these can be met. The IGAB has given remit to governments to resource the work to be undertaken in each of the schedules within it, but jurisdictions are struggling to undertake the work owing to funding difficulties. Governments must meet responsibilities under the IGAB, as well as those under emergency response agreements and those agreed in endorsed biosecurity plans that seek to mitigate risk for particular industries. Lack of adequate funding across all jurisdictions may risk decisions about eradication made based on funding issues rather than science, and may be contrary to Australia’s best interests.

As indicated in PHA’s response above in the early observations, PHA has concerns that if a fully sustainable funding model is not developed for the Australian government and State and Territories and implemented long term, future funding stresses on the agreement brought about by climate change, increasing trade and people movements may lead to the agreement’s breakdown. With a sustainable funding model in place, a binding agreement should be developed to ensure stability for Australia’s biosecurity system.

1
National system that aggregates information from digitised records of vouchered specimens of plant pests and pathogens within the sixteen major plant pest reference collections throughout Australia.
• Does the document structure of the IGAB allow for easy implementation and is it easy to comprehend?
PHA believes that the IGAB’s document structure allows for easy implementation and is easy to comprehend.

• Are the governance clauses effective or ineffective? How could these be amended?
The governance clauses are very high level which may make understanding more difficult for the everyday reader. For example:
o What is ALOP? The lack of understanding of how the ALOP is set has been expressed and has caused
frustrations from some plant industry members.
o Clause 28f notes that national priorities are identified for collaborative work by Parties. To make the
document easier to understand, should the document indicate where these priorities are spelt out in
more detail or have an explanatory document to the IGAB that does this e.g. has links to committee
pages, national action plans, etc? (this could be on the IGAB page on federation.gov.au?).

• Are the IGAB governance arrangements appropriate?
Yes, the IGAB has clauses outlining appropriate governance arrangements. However, PHA has concerns that these arrangements have not been implemented.

PHA notes that Clause 42 requires that the ‘report will be made public following Responsible Ministers’ consideration’. PHA understands that this requirement has not been implemented. Complying with this clause and making the report on the work program public will create transparency and understanding on performance against implementation of the agreement. It will highlight successes and identify areas that need further work/improvement as the system is complex. It will also inform future reviews of the agreement.

Clause 43 requires that the ‘AGSOC [Agriculture Senior Officials Committee] will establish and oversee an independent Evaluation Program to assess and report on implementation of each Party’s commitments under this Agreement’. PHA understands that this requirement has not been implemented.

2. Cross-jurisdictional cost sharing and funding arrangements
Independent reviewer’s early observations pages 10-11
PHA agrees with the independent reviewer’s observations on cross-jurisdictional cost sharing and funding arrangements.
• Funding is tight across the board, with the biosecurity system under significant stress as incursions and
responses are growing in number and complexity.
PHA agrees that Australia needs a well-funded sustainable biosecurity system at the National, State and
Territory levels to deliver effective rapid responses to plant pests, and to also deliver effective preparedness activities for exotic pests of national significance, and on-going management of established plant pests of national significance.
• There are gaps in the funding framework. There are deeds and agreements for cost sharing to fund
emergency responses, but other activities such as preparedness, surveillance, or containment are not
subject to these deeds and agreements and are managed on an ad-hoc basis.
The independent reviewer could consider the New Zealand’s ‘Government Industry Agreement for Biosecurity
Readiness and Response’ model as it funds preparedness activities also, enabling for prioritisation and coordination. Accepting the complexity of changes to the Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed, the independent reviewer should consider recommending new biosecurity investment be focused on tangible, performance driven preparedness work.
• There is an increase in incidents involving pests that affect multiple sectors including animals, plants, the
environment and sometimes humans. Existing deeds were not written with these situations in mind, and
more off-deed arrangements are being used to fund responses.
The independent reviewer could consider New Zealand’s ‘Government Industry Agreement for Biosecurity
Readiness and Response’ as an example of a way forward for multiple sector responses. A broader deed would be preferable to a proliferation of off-deed arrangements, as the latter would be complex to administer, time- consuming to draft and to reach agreement on, particularly in relation to funding.
• Response decision making needs to be completed earlier, with less focus on funding and more focus on
the economic, and socio-economic impacts. The independent reviewer has heard that delayed decision
making on how to respond to an incursion, significantly increases the cost of the response.
The independent reviewer could consider the New Zealand’s ‘Government Industry Agreement for Biosecurity
Readiness and Response’ model where the decision to respond occurs prior to deciding on funding and all response costs are shared. This would support rapid decision making based on economic/socio-economic impacts rather than funding.
• There is a need for a better prioritisation framework for biosecurity activities and better allocation of
funding for areas that arguably face greater incursion risk of serious diseases.
PHA agrees that there is a need for a better prioritisation framework for biosecurity activities and better allocation of preparedness funding for areas that arguably face greater incursion risk of serious diseases. Data sharing, the proposed HTS database and the Biosecurity Trakka should be prioritised, as they will underpin both preparedness and response activities.
• Limited funding in Australia’s biosecurity system significantly impedes government’s ability to effectively
implement the obligations under the IGAB.
PHA agrees with this statement. For sustained and coordinated action, Australia’s biosecurity system needs the certainty of a fully sustainable funding model. Otherwise it may run the risk of decisions about eradication being made based on funding issues rather than science, which may be contrary to Australia’s national interests.

Guiding question 2. What changes, if any, could be made to the current cost-sharing and funding arrangements for cross-jurisdictional activities outlined in the IGAB?
• How signatories to the agreement meet the funding arrangements outlined in the IGAB
The independent reviewer should consider recommending a stocktake of the overall funding situation for
Australia’s biosecurity system, as the discussion paper noted that there is no ‘clear picture of total investment in the national system. This is primarily because the range of investments and contributions by key parties is not routinely captured, reviewed, or invested on a national basis’. This audit could potentially be undertaken by the
Australian National Audit Office.

This stocktake could inform any changes that could improve the funding arrangements outlined in the IGAB. In line with clause 16, the stocktake should include funding contributions sourced from private beneficiaries and risk creators. Sectors that are beneficiaries of biosecurity activities but do not contribute (for example, tourism industries) should be included in the recommended stocktake, as well as sectors that benefit from the operation of one of the deeds (Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed, etc.) but are not a signatory to it.
• Changes that could be made to the funding arrangements outlined in IGAB
See comment above.
• Should the details of cost sharing arrangements be included in the IGAB
PHA does not consider that details of cost sharing arrangements should be included in the IGAB which is a very high-level document. The independent reviewer may consider that details of cost sharing arrangements become a supporting document to the IGAB (perhaps on the IGAB page on federation.gov.au?)
• How the cost sharing and funding arrangements are determined and met.
A stocktake as noted above may inform this question.

3. COVID-19 and the IGAB
Independent reviewer’s early observations page 12
PHA agrees with the independent reviewer’s observations on the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on Australia’s
biosecurity system.

• COVID-19 showed that the country can work together and adapt to achieve results. The pandemic
highlighted the magnitude of impact on Australia and shone a spotlight on the importance of biosecurity.

• Introduction of more advanced technology and remote working arrangements streamlined some
biosecurity processes through increased participation, virtual work environments, and faster
dissemination of information.

• Initial restrictions on staff movements greatly impacted on-the-ground biosecurity activities, with some
jurisdictions reporting the need to apply for up to 300 permits a day to allow their officers to undertake
their duties. Other jurisdictions noted reduced ability for staff to be ‘shared’ across borders.

• COVID-19 ‘clouded’ other biosecurity emergencies, resulting in delayed reaction times or poor
prioritisation of responses.
• Emergency-fatigue was mentioned by several state and territory government representatives. This
resulted in any biosecurity news becoming overwhelming or ultimately ignored due to the significant
increase in communications.

Guiding question 3. How did COVID-19 affect the functioning of the IGAB
• Any suggested amendments to clauses
PHA recommends that the independent reviewer considers adding additional text to at least one of the following Clauses to capture the need to plan for a human health pandemic or response to an animal disease that could involve human movement restrictions and breakdown of logistic chains causing shortages of necessary equipment such as Personal Protective Equipment and chemicals, traps, lures, etc. (added text in red and underlined):
Clause 7c
7. Biosecurity management is a complex task and Australia's biosecurity system will need to respond to increasing challenges that are changing its risk profile, including:
c. population spread, shifting demographics and changing land uses increasing the interface between
urban and rural areas and the natural environment, making pest and disease management more
complicated and increasing the risk of zoonoses impacting on human health and the need for
jurisdictional agreements to provide for continuity of biosecurity activities during any human health
lockdowns or movement restrictions associated with an animal disease response, as well as the
potential breakdown of logistic chains causing shortages of necessary equipment and supplies for a
response or on-going management.
Clause 22
22. The objectives of the national biosecurity system are to provide arrangements, structures and frameworks involving governments, industry and community that:
b. prepare and allow for effective responses to, and management of, exotic and emerging pests and
diseases that enter, establish or spread in Australia, including the need for jurisdictional agreements
to provide for continuity of biosecurity activities during any human health lockdowns or movement
restrictions associated with an animal disease response, as well as the potential breakdown of
logistic chains causing shortages of necessary equipment and supplies for a response or on-going
management.
c. ensure that, where appropriate, nationally significant pests and diseases already in Australia are
contained, suppressed or managed by relevant stakeholders including the need to carry out these
functions during any human health lockdowns or during movement restrictions associated with an
animal disease response, as well as overcome any potential breakdown of logistic chains causing
shortages of necessary equipment and supplies for a response or on-going management.
• how the IGAB could be futureproofed from pandemics such as COVID-19
Lockdowns and quarantine measures applied by jurisdictions to combat the COVID-19 pandemic had an important impact on biosecurity activities. As mentioned in the independent reviewer’s early observations, restrictions on staff movements greatly impacted on-the-ground biosecurity activities in jurisdictions.
PHA recommends that NBC direct jurisdictions to review COVID-19 impacts associated with biosecurity activities and to develop an agreement to reduce impacts on plant pest eradications, on-going management of pests including surveillance and other plant pest eradication/management issues that are likely to be impacted in a future human health pandemic or response to an animal disease that could involve human movement restrictions.
• observations you made on the functioning of the IGAB during the COVID-19 pandemic
PHA has no comment.

4. Previous and ongoing reviews
Do you have any comments about the review of the IGAB?
PHA considers the need for sustainable funding absolutely critical both at Local, State, Territory and Federal levels to protect Australia’s plant industries, environment, and social amenity to support both preparedness, response and on-going management activities.
As all members of our society benefit from biosecurity, everyone should contribute to sustainable funding.